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First, it defines clandestine organizations in such a way that Klans and other furtive outfits created for evil purposes are included. It then defines a criminal conspiracy so as to embrace certain organized operations which Klans and other terroristic groups have used to further their aims.

Then, what does it do?

It makes it a crime for any member or agent of a clandestine organization, in promoting the organization's aims, to travel or use any facility in interstate commerce, or conspire with or solicit another person to do so, to commit or promote any crime of violence against another.

Penalty: \$10,000, 20 years, or life imprisonment if a killing results.

It makes it a crime for a member or agent of a clandestine organization, in promoting the organization's aims, to murder, kidnap, assault, or try to murder or kidnap, any person moving in interstate commerce.

Penalty, appropriate to each of these crimes: from 5 years and \$5,000, to life imprisonment or death if a killing takes place.

It makes it a crime for a member or agent of a clandestine organization, in promoting the organization's aims, to unlawfully obstruct, by force, threat, or intimidation, the free movement of any person in interstate commerce.

Penalty: \$1,000, or 2 years.

It makes it a crime to teach or advocate the duty or desirability of using force, violence, or any unlawful means, to advance the purposes of a clandestine organization doing business in interstate commerce, or to intimidate, punish, or injure any citizen.

It makes it a crime to teach, or demonstrate, the use of explosives or any device capable of injuring a person or property, with the purpose that it be used to further the objectives of a clandestine organization, or to intimidate, punish or injure any person.

Penalty for both these offenses: \$10,000, or 10 years.

It makes it a crime for a member or agent of a clandestine organization, in furthering its aims, to use radio, wireless or telephone to assist the commission or concealment of, or to prevent detection or arrest for, an offense against the United States.

Penalty: \$5,000, or 5 years.

It makes it a crime, in connection with the activities of a clandestine organization, to administer or take an oath to conceal an offense against the United States committed by another member of the organization.

Penalty: \$500, or 2 years.

It makes it a crime for an officer of a clandestine organization to embezzle the organization's funds.

Penalty: \$5,000, or 5 years.

It provides for the surrender to the Government of any vehicle used, in interstate commerce, with the knowledge and consent of the owner, to transport any person, weapon, or explosive, with the intent they will be used to commit a crime of violence against another person or his property.

It gives the Attorney General power to obtain a

action planned by members of a clandestine organization to further its objectives by committing any offense against the United States or an act of violence, intimidation, or harassment against any citizen.

To make this provision effective, it gives the courts, with the approval of the Attorney General, the power to grant immunity to witnesses, and also provides punishment—by a contempt proceeding—for any witness who, after being given immunity, refuses to testify or produce records. In any case of criminal contempt, it provides for trial by jury.

The bill also, of course, has a nonpreemption provision, so that no local statute is nullified by any of its provisions.

During my illness and recuperation, I gave long and prayerful thought to this bill. I believe it provides the medicine we need to cure the disease with which Klanism would infect our society.

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WILLIS. I yield to my friend from Georgia.

(Mr. WELTNER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for yielding, and I wish to commend him, our very distinguished chairman of the committee, on his statement and upon the legislative proposals which he has here outlined.

Mr. Speaker, I believe it is important that this Nation undertake to protect the rights which we have secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States to the citizens of our country.

Certainly, Mr. Speaker, the criminal provisions recommended by the gentleman in the bill, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. WILLIS], should provide a strong measure of protection for those rights.

But, Mr. Speaker, I believe that equally, or more important, than the prosecution of crime is the prevention of crime. Thus I am particularly pleased that the chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities has urged the enactment of a clear civil procedure for injunction.

Mr. WILLIS. Mr. Speaker, may I say to my friend, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. WELTNER], that the idea, in fact, of an injunctive relief came out of the gentleman's mind, and I was very delighted to make that a part of my own bill, because it is as necessary to prevent as to punish after an act is committed.

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, the chairman of the Committee on Un-American Activities is quite generous. The inclusion in his bill of this measure is very important, and I am delighted to see such a procedure proposed, so that organizations which make a career of depriving citizens of the United States of the rights and privileges and immunities guaranteed them by the laws and the Constitution might be subject to the power of the Courts of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that this will be an effective preventive of terror and misery that for the past century has been

serve to prevent other criminal conspiracies, as the gentleman from Louisiana has pointed out. It will help to rid the South of an age-old evil, the Ku Klux Klan.

Mr. WILLIS. Mr. Speaker, may I say to my good friend, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. WELTNER], that it has been a pleasure to have him as a tower of strength on the committee which I chair and I wish to commend the gentleman as well as to commend my friend, the gentleman from Texas, whom I see on the floor, who was so patient with me during the hearings and who attended with such zeal and devotion to their duties during the long trying hearings which we have had.

Mr. Speaker, we tried to do, anyway, an objective and impartial job. And, by the way, may I say that my last act before I left this body to go to the hospital was to cite certain outstanding Klansmen for contempt of this body. I intend shortly—in order to have a balanced committee—to bring before this House citations for contempt arising out of our Chicago hearings in the field of subversive activities.

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, I need not assure the gentleman of the high esteem and regard in which he is held by the other members of this committee, and I would commend to all Members of the House of Representatives and to all who are interested the record compiled under the chairmanship of the distinguished gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. WILLIS]. It is a record of fairness and of equity, concerning some of the most difficult hearings, under most trying circumstances.

Mr. WILLIS. Mr. Speaker, I might point out, finally, that since I have been chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities not a single action was taken, not a single vote cast in all instances without unanimity on the part of both the minority and the majority side of the committee.

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to chair a committee where we have such wholehearted support, and I have an idea that we can make pretty short work of the legislative hearings upon my bill and should be able to report it back to the House of Representatives quite soon.

Mr. WELTNER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for yielding.

THE CIA

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). Under previous order of the House the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN] is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, there is a great deal of current discussion concerning the Central Intelligence Agency. Much of it has taken place in the Senate.

The real issue at hand, which has been the subject of six special congressional and executive commissions, investigations, and task forces, is the extent to which the CIA is involved in the making of our foreign policy, and the proper role of Congress in supervising the CIA.

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It is generally recognized that the United States needs an organization to collect, correlate, and interpret foreign intelligence information, in order to protect the national security, formulate foreign policy, and unify national power, purpose, and policy in this age of perpetual crisis.

There have been instances, most notably, the Bay of Pigs disaster of 1961, in which the operations of the Agency had the tendency of propelling policy, of narrowing the area of choice and decision and of closing out options to our political leaders.

With cases such as these in mind, the essential question boils down to this: "Are there sufficient checks upon the CIA to assure both efficient CIA operation and democratic government?" More specifically, in regard to the Senate debate, the question could be phrased, "Is more congressional surveillance of the CIA needed, for example, a joint congressional committee or larger committees in both Houses?"

I have no categorical or systematic answer to this question. However, I do wish to make some observations.

Most importantly, the CIA is an executive agency under the authority of the President. The CIA is not an arm of the Congress. The President is constitutionally responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. Availability to the President of intelligence is obviously an essential element in the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign affairs. Accordingly, the CIA is the President's staff organization which evaluates information obtained from departments and agencies of the Government and keeps him abreast from day to day of activities abroad affecting the national interest.

There is presently substantial supervision of the CIA, both congressional and executive. Ever since the Agency was created in 1947 by the National Security Act, seven Senators from the Armed Services Committee and the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee handling the defense budget have constituted the group to which the Agency's Director has reported. On the House side, the Director has reported to two subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. In the executive branch, both the Bureau of the Budget and the General Accounting Office regulate CIA expenditures. The Bureau of the Budget has special review procedures and the General Accounting Office audits CIA funds. Further control is exercised by the Director and high officials of the CIA.

Congress in drafting the National Security Act of 1947 properly recognized that the CIA, to be effective, would have to be an executive agency responsible to the Chief Executive. By statute, Congress gave the President, the National Security Council, and the CIA which operates under the NSC, broad and largely undefined discretionary powers—with few specific restraints. The Congress voluntarily walled itself off from detailed information.

The question of recognizing the activities of a national spy network with

democratic processes is not a simple matter. Perhaps there is, philosophically at least, an inevitable conflict between the ideals of an open society and the wielding of great power on the world scene.

I have no doubt that intelligence operations are important in protecting vital security interests, depending of course upon how one interprets these interests.

I do wish to point out that an essential element of any intelligence organization is its secrecy. Its day-to-day activities must be kept from the public eye, for revelation will destroy its ability to function effectively.

To what extent the Agency should be controlled, and by whom, is a question that affects its powers intimately and may have enormous repercussions. Individuals who are concerned with civil liberties, as I am, and who have occasion to gently rap the Agency for overstepping its bounds, must be aware that they are dealing with no ordinary institution.

Having said these things, I do believe, despite the potential for irresolution on many fundamental issues, that there is a line which delineates proper conduct in foreign intelligence from improper conduct. What I mean here is that I do not wish this silent interloper to involve itself in the private lives of American citizens at home.

In this connection there are two recent cases which come to mind. I am deeply disturbed about the implications of the lawsuit of Heine against Raus. Only those aspects of the case which relate to the role of the CIA are in question here.

The facts are that Juri Raus, an employee of the Bureau of Public Roads, was hired by the Central Intelligence Agency following his election as commander of the Legion of Estonian Liberation. Because of his unique position in this emigre community, Raus was hired to develop foreign intelligence information and sources.

Now, the legion is composed of American citizens. While the association may in fact maintain various contacts abroad, largely secret, it is in essence an American organization functioning on American soil.

This is the kind of operation to which I must object. It may be true that these groups are particularly rewarding sources of foreign intelligence; similarly, the Agency is not interested in the administrative or organizational activities of the emigre group per se, but rather in the data which the group may be in a position to furnish regarding events abroad. Hence, the CIA's motivating instinct is the collection of foreign intelligence.

However this may be, the fact is that an agent of this Agency penetrated an American organization in a clandestine effort to use its resources. I cannot believe that Mr. Raus' intentions were generally known to the legion's membership.

Raus was also ordered to warn his emigre friends about the Canadian citizen Erik Heine, who is said to be a KGB agent. Heine was disturbed that the sources which the

legion had available, and which it was using, would be endangered if Heine were granted access to this information.

I strongly question the propriety of this procedure. I do not think the CIA has the authority to covertly infiltrate domestic institutions and groups which may or may not maintain contacts behind the Iron Curtain. The real or potential assistance which these groups provide in the collection of foreign intelligence matter is essentially irrelevant. Nor do I believe the security of this country is imperiled by any activity undertaken by these captive nations groups in America. If such be the case—and I am thinking of foreign spies—then I would defer to the FBI.

What business is it of the CIA if an alleged KGB agent is dispatched to spy on the operations of the Legion of Estonian Liberation? Is it the proper province of the CIA to combat his influence within this American emigre community? Certainly not. But this can be the unfortunate result if the Agency assumes the power of utilizing private, domestic concerns for its own clandestine purposes.

The second case deals with a recent article appearing in the current issue of "Foreign Affairs." This is a very influential and distinguished journal. I am told that its sway within the intellectual and leadership ranks of the nation is substantial. Among other things, it indoctrinates its potent readership in the classic anti-de Gaulle curriculum.

George A. Carver, Jr. wrote a piece entitled "The Faceless Vietcong." It is an admirable, scholarly presentation. Mr. Carver is described as a student of political theory and Asian affairs, with degrees from Yale and Oxford; former officer in the U.S. aid mission in Saigon; author of *Aesthetics and the Problem of Meaning*.

He is obviously well schooled. One can believe that his brief history of the Vietnam business in this journal is reputable and articulate.

What else does Mr. Carver do?

Well, he is employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. I presume that his tenure with the aid mission in Saigon was for reasons other than rendering economic assistance.

The interesting thing is that Mr. Carver, whom I have not heard of previous to this, gets top billing, although he is merely a student of political theory and Asian affairs. Other less important figures, such as the President of Tanzania, Mr. Nyerere; Mr. David Rockefeller; the President of Tunisia; and the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Eugene M. Zuckert, are relegated to less prominent positions in this roster of international heavyweights.

Of course, Mr. Carver's contribution concerns the most topical of all current affairs. Thus we may presume he has a right to the top spot.

Mr. Carver, on behalf of the U.S. Government, makes a conscious and determined effort to justify the official policy in Vietnam. I would not take exception to this procedure if Mr. Carver were, in my Government. But this is not the case;

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we are left in doubt about his present business.

Thus we have an unidentified operative of a secret intelligence society utilizing an influential forum to propagandize the American people. This seems to be a violation of what I would consider the legitimate reach of a democratic government.

I have cited these two recent developments because they point, disturbingly, toward the conclusion that our foreign intelligence mechanism is attending to associated interests on the domestic front.

Let me add, in connection with the second instance, that Congress has specifically prohibited our foreign propaganda instrument, the USIA, from turning its persuasive techniques on the American people. The reasons are self-evident.

My objection to Mr. Carver's appearance is not based on the content of his article, nor the very fact that he, as a Government employee, chose to write for Foreign Affairs. I think it is a good practice; the people must know what our higher bureaucrats are thinking about, and they have a right to know.

But I would like for these authorities to be identified. In the case of the CIA, this may be unwise, so I would suggest that it desist completely from public debate in the news and communications media.

In connection with Mr. Raus' present discomfort, we should look back upon the legislation which established the Agency. The organization was specifically denied internal security functions. The argument that the Agency may ignore the letter and spirit of this prohibition because the end in mind is to collect foreign intelligence is spurious and dangerous for the ban itself is aimed directly at the means which the Agency may employ in its pursuits.

Because the Agency is necessarily shielded from public exposure, the responsibility for proper supervision and discretion falls heavily upon the Director and senior officials. This responsibility must be exercised in a manner which does not excessively or repeatedly test the principal tenets of this free and open society.

INVASION OF PRIVACY

(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I have the privilege of being chairman of the Special Subcommittee on the Question of the Invasion of Privacy. This committee is a tribute to the able and distinguished chairman of the Government Operations Committee, the Honorable WILLIAM DAWSON, and his concern for his fellow men. For the past year this group, comprised of the gentlemen from New York (Mr. ROSENTHAL and Mr. HORTON) and myself, have conducted an investigation into a number of invasion of privacy practices involving the activities of Federal agencies.

I am happy to report that substantial progress has been made to reassert the right to privacy not only of Federal employees, but also of many Americans who take part in research projects financed with Federal funds. It has been our hope that the Federal Government could set some guidelines that would help define the problem as it relates to private industry.

The subcommittee is now turning its attention to privacy matters involving proposals to establish Federal data centers, sometimes called "dossier banks."

The Federal Government now has about 15,000 computers at an approximate cost of \$6 billion. The present studies to centralize certain types of information call for a corollary study of this problem to protect the public interest and the rights of the individual citizen. Great technological progress has been made in the field of computers and data processing that can be of tremendous value to our future. It is, however, essential that human dignity and integrity are not subordinated in the interest of economy and efficiency as man moves into the computerized age.

There is no doubt that the computerized centralization of information from the records of the Federal Government will facilitate many governmental operations. However, the possibility that such a data center would become the depository for much personal information on millions of our citizens raises questions which have serious implications.

As time goes on, there will be great pressure to include more and more individual data in the computers. Theoretically, it would be possible to press a button and obtain an instant dossier on any one of millions of people. We must make certain that there are adequate safeguards to protect the right to privacy of Americans as the Government moves into the next stage of progress.

If the Government does set up a central file or "dossier bank" of personal data on our citizens, there will be a huge store of information at hand to feed it. That list includes tax returns, census responses, social security data, military records, security files, fingerprints, mortgage guarantees, research involving individuals, and, if State and local governments are tied into the system, such things as school records, police files, driving violations, and property holdings. Confidentiality is now protected in many cases by the law. Centralization will create the need for a new set of safeguards. It might even be possible to pump credit reports and bank accounts into the computer. It should be apparent to anyone the great power that would exist behind the Federal official who has the authority to push the button that would produce such a dossier instantly.

Mr. Speaker, the proposed establishment of a Federal data bank poses dangers to the privacy of our citizens which could dwarf anything stemming from electronic eavesdropping and other modern snooping devices. I am hopeful that the hearings we plan to hold will create a climate of concern in the Government

on the problems relating to invasion of privacy inherent in the proposals to set up data service centers.

One problem is that computers never forgive and certainly never forget. The school dropouts of today may turn out to be the computer reject of tomorrow. We must remember, too, that many of our citizens give the Government personal information on a confidential basis and for a specific purpose. Tax returns and census questionnaire answers are examples. Americans deserve the assurance that this information will not be used for any other purpose. We should also consider the possibility of allowing every citizen the right to inspect his own dossier to make certain it is completely accurate. Without safeguards such as these, there is a possibility of great injustice.

Our Government should decide now just who will have the power to push what computer buttons under what conditions. We must consider, too, how confidentiality can be properly programed, and what information should be stored. The answer may be more important to liberty than the other big button we often worry about. The potential dangers of a U.S. citizen at the mercy of a computerized society are appalling. We cannot safely presume that all of this information will always be used by benevolent people for benevolent purposes. It is quite conceivable that a potential Big Brother could make excellent use of a big button on a dossier bank for his own purposes. This would strike at the very fundamentals of our governmental structure and society.

We must consider and consider now whether our laws and public opinion are keeping pace with our rapidly expanding technologies. The technology of computerization has raised new horizons of progress. It also brings with it inherent dangers. The greatest of these dangers is that we allow ourselves to drift into a course that will substitute a computer for man's free will. It is my hope that our hearing will shed some light on this problem—a problem that concerns every citizen.

I am hopeful that the scientific community who created this technology will bear an equal responsibility to protect our free democratic society from their awesome creations. I am sure they will. But, in the final analysis it is we, the elected officials of the Government, who must bear the responsibility that science and research continue to serve man and that the basic values of privacy and all that free man treasures are not sacrificed in the name of scientific achievement.

SAVINGS AND LOANS OVER THE NATION DEMAND END TO RATE WAR

(Mr. PATMAN (at the request of Mr. HICKS) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. Speaker, the rate war on savings deposits, started last December by the Federal Reserve Board, is having serious repercussions through-